Key infection is a lightweight key-distribution protocol for partially compromised wireless sensor networks, where sensor nodes send cryptographic keys in the clear. As the adversary is assumed to be present partially at the deployment stage, some keys are eavesdropped but others remain secret. To enhance the security of key infection, secrecy amplification combines keys propagated along different paths. Two neighbor nodes W 1 and W 2 can use another node W 3 to update their key. If W 3 is outside of the eavesdropping region of the adversary, the updated key is guaranteed to be secure. To date, the effectiveness of secrecy amplification has been demonstrated only by simulation. In this article, we present the first mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification. Our result shows that the effectiveness of secrecy amplification increases as the distance between the two neighbor nodes decreases. key words: sensor network, smart dust, key management, key infection
Introduction
A wireless sensor network consists of a large number of tiny, cheap, and resource-constrained sensor nodes. For example, 'smart dust' with a volume of one cubic millimeter can be distributed in large numbers by random scattering (e.g., from an airplane) [1] . When a large number of sensor nodes are deployed, it is often difficult for an adversary to eavesdrop on all of the communication.
Anderson, Chan, and Perrig proposed 'key infection' to deal with the key distribution problem in environments with a partially present adversary [2] . At the deployment stage, keys are sent in the clear but the partially present adversary cannot eavesdrop on all the keys. Therefore, some keys are compromised but others remain secret.
Secrecy amplification is a post-deployment technique to establish an updated key from multiple old keys propagated along different paths. Let k 12 be the key established between two neighbor nodes W 1 Previous works on key infection show the effectiveness of secrecy amplification based on simulations (e.g., [3] ) and no rigorous mathematical analysis has been performed. In this article, we provide the first mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification. We compute the probability of effective secrecy amplification (i.e., the probability of updating a compromised key to a secure key) as a function of the distance between two neighbor nodes W 1 and W 2 . The analysis shows that secrecy amplification is more effective for near nodes than for distant nodes.
Preliminaries
For a point P, P x and P y denote the x-and y-coordinate. C P denotes a circle centered at P. Circle C P with radius R is the set
For two circles C P 1 and C P 2 , I[C P 1 , C P 2 ] = C P 1 ∩C P 2 denotes the intersection points of C P 1 and C P 2 . To distinguish between (two) intersection points, I
ξ [C P 1 , C P 2 ] denotes the intersection point in quadrant ξ. For two circles C P 1 and C P 2 with the radius R where P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ) and P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ),
the intersection points I[C P 1 , C P 2 ] can be expressed as
By substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (2), we can have
For a point P = (P x , P y ), D P denotes a disk centered at P. Disk D P with radius R is the set 
Secrecy Amplification
At the deployment stage of key infection, a key is established between each pair of neighbor sensor nodes in a partially compromised network. Let W 1 and W 2 be honest (or white) neighbor nodes and B be an adversarial (or black) node. Let R be the maximum range of the radio. Nodes are assumed to transmit at the maximum strength all the time; we do not consider nodes adjusting transmission power adaptively (e.g., whispering mode). Since the attacker in commodity sensor networks is able to monitor only a small proportion (α) of the communications of the sensor network during the deployment phase (e.g., α = 1 ∼ 3%) [2] , we assume that there is at most one black node within the common transmission ranges of two white nodes (i.e.,
To update k 12 , W 1 and W 2 can use another neighbor node W 3 . Let k i j be the key established between W i and W j at the deployment stage. During the secrecy amplification, each message sent between W i and W j is encrypted with the established key k i j . Unless the black node B is able to eavesdrop on all the communication channels between W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 (i.e., B already knows k 12 , k 13 , and k 23 ), the old key k 12 can be updated to a new secure key.
Mathematical Analysis
To measure the effectiveness of secrecy amplification, we compute the probability that a compromised key k 12 is updated to a secure key. All circles and disks in this section will have radius R and thus we often omit the radius.
The first sub-figure of Fig. 1 shows two white nodes W 1 = (W 1x , W 1y ) = (−λ/2, 0) and W 2 = (W 2x , W 2y ) = (λ/2, 0) on the x-axis, where λ is the distance between W 1 and W 2 . The coordinates of P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 6 are as follows. . Therefore, the probability of effective secrecy amplification is equal to the conditional probability Fig. 1 , we can compute the probability ψ by assuming that B is in quadrant I. Let ψ B be the probability of effective secrecy amplification ψ for a fixed black node B. Then, for a black node
in quadrant I, the probability ψ B can be computed by a ratio of areas
where Area{·} denotes the area of the argument region and Region-0. This region is bounded by the x-axis, the y-axis, and arc W 2 P 7 of C P 4 where P 7 = (0, R − R 2 − (λ/2) 2 ). If B is in Region-0, it holds that |B − P i | ≤ R for i = 2, 3, 4, 5 and
and from Eq. (7), we have
In other words, B in Region-0 can eavesdrop on any
and secrecy amplification always fails.
Region-1.
This region is bounded by the y-axis, arc W 2 P 7 of C P 4 , and arc W 2 P 8 of C P 5 , where
. We use the center of three points W 2 , P 7 , P 8 as the representative position of B in Region-1, which approximates Region-1 to triangle W 2 P 7 P 8 .
By Eq. (5), we can compute the x-coordinates of intersection points
, where W 1 = (−λ/2, 0) and W 2 = (λ/2, 0). In Region-1 of Fig. 1 , we have Q y ≥ P 4y and Q y ≥ P 4y because B stays over W 2 P 7 of C P 4 . We have Q y ≤ 0 and Q y ≤ 0 because B stays below W 2 P 8 of C P 5 and P 8 satisfies that |P 2 − P 8 | = |P 5 − P 8 | = R. Therefore, Q and Q belong to quadrant IV and quadrant III, respectively.
For a circle C P : (x − P x ) 2 + (y − P y ) 2 = R 2 , we denote explicit solutions as f
For secrecy amplification to succeed, W 3 should be in
that is bounded by points Q, Q , P 4 . By Eq. (7), the probability of effective secrecy amplification in Region-1 can be computed as follows.
Region-2. This region is bounded by the y-axis, arc P 3 P 12 of C W 1 , and arc P 8 P 12 of C P 2 , where
We use the center of three points P 3 , P 8 , P 12 as the representative position of B in Region-2, which approximates Region-2 to triangle P 3 P 8 P 12 .
. In Region-2 of Fig. 1 , we have Q y ≥ 0 and Q y ≥ 0 because B stays over P 8 P 12 of C P 2 in quadrant I and it holds that
By Eq. (7), the probability of effective secrecy amplification in Region-2 can be computed as follows.
Region-3. This region is bounded by arc P 8 P 12 of C P 2 , arc W 2 P 8 of C P 5 , arc W 2 P 9 of C P 1 , and arc P 9 P 12 of C W 1 , where P 9 = (R/2, R 2 − (R/2 + λ/2) 2 ). We cannot use the center of four points P 3 , P 8 , W 2 , P 9 as the representative position of B in Region-3, because it gets out of Region-3 as λ → R. Instead, we use the middle point of the Region-3 segment of C P 11 , where 
. In Region-3 of Fig. 1 , we have Q y ≤ 0 because B stays under P 8 P 12 of C P 2 and it holds that |P 8 − P 2 | = |P 12 − P 2 | = R. We have Q y ≥ 0 because B stays to the right of W 2 P 8 of C P 5 and it holds that |W 2 − P 5 | = |P 8 − P 5 | = R. Therefore, Q and Q belong to quadrant IV and quadrant II, respectively.
By Eq. (7), the probability of effective secrecy amplification in Region-3 can be computed as follows.
Region-4. This region is bounded by arc W 2 P 9 of C P 1 , arc W 2 P 10 of C P 3 , and arc P 9 P 10 of C W 1 . We use the center of three points W 2 , P 9 , P 10 as the representative position of B in Region-4, which approximates Region-4 to a triangle.
where
. By Eq. (6), we can compute the y-coordinates of intersection points
. In Region-4 of Fig. 1 , we have Q x ≥ 0 because B x ≥ W 2x and |P 4 − W 2 | = R. We have Q x ≤ 0 because B stays over W 2 P 10 of C P 3 and to the left of P 9 P 10 of C W 1 . Therefore, Q and Q belong to quadrant IV and quadrant II, respectively. By Eq. (7), the probability of effective secrecy amplification in Region-4 can be computed as follows.
Region-5. This region is bounded by the x-axis, arc W 2 P 10 of C P 3 , and arc P 2 P 10 of C W 1 . We use the center of three points W 2 , P 2 , P 10 as the position of B in Region-5. Fig. 1 , we have Q x ≥ 0 and Q x ≥ 0 because B stays below W 2 P 10 of C P 3 and to the right of W 2 , and P 4 satisfies |P 4 − W 2 | = R. Therefore, Q and Q belong to quadrant IV and quadrant I, respectively. By Eq. (7), the probability of effective secrecy amplification in Region-5 can be computed as follows.
We compute the area of Region-i A i = Area{Region-i} and the sum of six areas A = 5 i=0 A i as follows.
dydx,
Finally, the probability of effective secrecy amplification is
where ψ i for i = 0, . . . show the tendency that secrecy amplification is more effective for nodes with small distances. Approximately, the effectiveness of secrecy amplification for near nodes can be 30-40% and that for distant nodes can be 10-20%. The maximum difference between the two graphs in Fig. 2 is 0.0535 at λ R = 1, where the probability of effective secrecy amplification is 0.0496 by Eq. (14) and 0.1031 by the simulation result. Generally, the difference is less than 0.0535 and thus Eq. (14) seems to be valid (and useful) for most practical applications.
Conclusion
Key infection with secrecy amplification is a very efficient key distribution protocol. Our mathematical analysis of secrecy amplification shows that near nodes can enjoy higher levels of security. The analysis was performed under the assumption that the transmission power of each node is fixed (i.e., R). We leave the analysis of secrecy amplification where nodes can adjust transmission power adaptively (e.g., whispering mode) as an open problem.
